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I.  Introduction 
In this paper, I first trace the evolution of the global trading system from the 19th century 
to the present-day GATT/WTO arrangements, calling attention to the key roles of reciprocity and 
non-discrimination and taking note of how the system is now challenged by the new paradigm of 
global market integration.  In Sections III and IV, the main features of the WTO are described, 
the boundaries of the WTO identified, and how the expansion of these boundaries may result in 
the over-extension and weakening of the effectiveness of the WTO.  Section V concludes. 
II.  The Global Trading System:  Yesterday and Today
1 
“I don't think they play at all fairly,” Alice began in a rather complaining tone, “and 
they all quarrel so dreadfully one can hardly hear oneself speak – and they don't seem to 
have any rules in particular; at least, if there are, no one attends to them...”  Lewis 
Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, p. 112 
To a reader in the 19th century, that might well have seemed a fair description of global trading 
relations at the time rather than of a game of croquet in the Queen of Hearts court.  It was only in 
the course of the 19th century that the beginnings of some order, as we know it today, began to 
emerge.  Industrialization was taking hold in several countries, and it generated an intensified 
search for foreign markets and sources of supply.  Governments in Europe were faced with calls 
to lower tariff barriers on imported inputs and to negotiate reductions in tariffs protecting foreign 
markets.  But in a nationalistic world of vying states – as it still is today – governments were not 
about to ease access to their markets in the absence of some quid pro quo.  
The way forward was found in the adoption of two instruments of policy – reciprocity 
and non-discrimination – which set off a wave of trade liberalization.  These two ideas enabled 
                                                 
1 This section has been adapted from Brown and Stern (2007). countries to surmount their innate distrust of each other and to engage in mutually beneficial and 
generalized reductions in tariff barriers.  Reciprocity – meaning contingent and equivalent 
concessions – assuaged the fear of governments that they might not be receiving at least as much 
from others as they were giving themselves, and non-discrimination reassured them that they 
were enjoying the same treatment as had been won by other competing states.  Neither of these 
ideas was a sudden intellectual invention; they had long been known in human affairs.  But their 
application to trade relations was comparatively new and did much to advance global trade 
liberalization.   
  Historians usually identify the signing of the Anglo-French Treaty of 1860 as the 
landmark that signaled the new era of trade relations. Besides the need for a political gesture of 
friendship, the immediate cause of the signing of the Treaty was a decision by the French 
government to follow Britain's policy of trade liberalization.  The French leaders were persuaded 
at the time by the popular, but mistakenly simplistic and mono-causal, belief that Britain's 
superior industrial performance owed much to its free trade policy.  However, in undertaking to 
reduce tariffs on British manufactures, the French government sought some concession from 
Britain in order to win the support of its export interests in getting the lower tariffs passed 
through Parliament.  Although Britain had already nailed the flag of free trade to its mast – and 
firmly, but exceptionally, believed that others in their own interest should also reduce their tariffs 
unilaterally – it accommodated the French political need.
2  Further, when other European 
countries anxiously sought comparable access to the French market, France offered them the 
same tariff rates that it had set for Britain.  The inclusion of such a most-favored-nation (MFN) 
clause in commercial treaties thereafter became common practice among the European states.  It 
also had the advantage of preventing treaties from being in a constant state of flux with tariff 
schedules having repeatedly to be renegotiated bilaterally.   
                                                 
2 For a full account of the Anglo-French negotiations, see Hinde (1987). For a history of multilateral trade 
relations over the period 1850 to 2000, see Brown (2003). 
  2  What emerged in industrializing Europe from the struggle of countries to gain market 
access for their exports of manufactured goods was a network of bilateral, commercial treaties 
linked together through the MFN clause.  While this was a step toward more predictable trade 
relations, however, the system was not notable for its stability.  Apart from Britain – which 
adhered with almost religious fervor to free trade – most European countries found their treaty 
obligation hard to live with.  After a drift toward freer trade in the 1850s and 1860s, most 
countries later assumed more protectionist stances.  Commercial treaties were frequently 
denounced or renegotiated, and some lengthy and bitter trade wars broke out. Still, while every 
country valued the freedom to make unilateral decisions about its national trade barriers, all were 
driven reluctantly to accept constraints on their behavior in order to gain access to others' 
markets.   
  The outbreak of WWI in 1914 and the political upheaval engendered in its aftermath 
disrupted trade relations for some years.  Nevertheless, in the peace conferences following the 
war, the avowed goal of governments was to restore the pre-1914 order in international monetary, 
financial, and trade relations. But economic conditions militated against a restoration of the 
minimal levels of mutual trust necessary for agreements.  In the unstable monetary conditions of 
the early 1920s, countries engaged in currency depreciations that were seen by others as 
competitive and that, in line with economic thinking of the time, made the negotiation of tariff 
reductions pointless.  For a while, in the later 1920s, restoration of the gold standard made the 
outlook appear more hopeful for trade relations.  But the differences in tariff levels between the 
high and low tariff countries were sizable, and governments could not agree on a common 
formula for tariff cutting.  The onset of the Depression in the 1930s and the early responses to it, 
with tariff increases and currency devaluations, put an end to any hopes for more normal trade 
relations.  
Some countries, led by Germany, resorted to bilateral barter or clearing arrangements that 
were necessarily discriminatory.  Others, like Britain, sought to revive trade through the creation 
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demand, trade relations largely ceased to be conducted within a multilateral framework based on 
non-discrimination. 
  It is notable that the United States played virtually no part in the evolution of trade 
relations before WWI and remained largely aloof from international trade affairs in the inter-war 
years.  American manufacturing and marketing skills had become internationally evident as early 
as the 1890s, but the United States remained for many years principally an exporter of primary 
commodities.  It was fortunate that agricultural exports generally met with low trade barriers 
before WWI, so there were few restraints on the U.S. pursuit of a high tariff policy on imported 
manufactures.  Indeed, the U.S. Congress could then interpret reciprocity as the negotiation of 
reductions in foreign tariffs under the threat of increases in American tariffs.  MFN treatment was 
also offered only conditionally so that to qualify for a new MFN tariff rate, all trading partners 
had to offer equivalent tariff reductions. 
  However, by the 1920s the interest of U.S. manufacturing industries in foreign markets 
had grown substantially with the share of manufactures having risen to nearly two thirds of total 
exports.  A latecomer in the world of trade relations, it was only then that the United States began 
gradually to accommodate itself to the accepted international norms.  With the adoption of the 
Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act in 1922, the principle of unconditional MFN treatment was 
adopted. And in 1934, the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act made reciprocity – 
understood as equivalence in concessions – the accepted means of gaining improved access to 
foreign markets.  
The New Era of the General Agreement on Tariffs and  Trade  (GATT)  and  the  World         
Trade Organization (WTO) 
Following WWII, which ended in 1945, the United States launched its grand design to establish 
an orderly multilateral framework for international monetary, financial, and trade relations.  The 
ideas of non-discrimination and reciprocity again became central to the global arrangements for 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Two factors reinforced the great importance given by 
U.S. policy makers at the time to the principle of non-discrimination.  One was the conviction of 
the Roosevelt Administration’s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, that the trade discrimination 
practiced internationally in the 1930s exacerbated the bitter political rivalries in a period that had 
finally terminated in war.  The other was the more commercial reason that U.S. manufacturers 
particularly resented the British imperial preferences erected in the early 1930s.  
The ideas of non-discrimination and reciprocity have contributed substantially to the 
progressive reduction of trade barriers on manufactured goods among the core industrialized 
countries, including North America, Western Europe, and Japan, since the end of WWII. The 
core countries, until very recently, dominated trade relations within the framework of the GATT, 
and their central focus was on the reduction of industrial tariffs.  The degree to which these tariffs 
have been reduced can be seen for selected countries in Figure 1 for the period from 1913 to the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  In the early years of the post-WWII GATT negotiating 
rounds, these tariff reductions were negotiated bilaterally on a reciprocal basis. Later, in the 
Kennedy Round in the 1960s, reciprocity was expressed in the adoption of a common tariff 
formula that replaced or supplemented bilateral negotiations.  In principle, the core countries 
likewise adhered largely to non-discrimination in their trade with each other.  But, subsequently, 
in practice, they deviated substantially in the 1970s and 1980s by resort to measures outside the 
framework of the GATT.  These measures mainly took the form of voluntary export restraints or 
orderly marketing agreements.  While their incidence fell more on Japan and some of the newly 
industrializing countries in East Asia and elsewhere, this evasion of GATT rules became so 
prevalent that it seriously undermined the respect for the system on which its existence depended.  
It was partly for this reason that governments during the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-
1993) agreed to eschew these practices and so reaffirm adherence to non-discrimination. 
  5Thus, up to and even including the Uruguay Round, it could be fairly said that the ideas 
of reciprocity and non-discrimination largely shaped international trade relations.  But events 
brought about changes during and after the Uruguay Round.  Reciprocity lost some of its 
relevance and clarity as a guiding principle; and, in the face of the proliferation of free trade 
agreements (FTAs), non-discrimination in trade relations among states appeared to fade into the 
background. 
Reciprocity and the Changing Character of Trade Negotiations 
Two changes taking place during and since the Uruguay Round have muddied the nature of 
reciprocity as an idea guiding multilateral trade relations.  The first is that, at the behest of the 
industrial countries, the content of trade negotiations has been substantially broadened; and the 
second is that the developing countries – thanks largely to their emergence as significant 
exporters of manufactures – have become influential participants in these negotiations.   
  Among the major industrial countries, the negotiation of improved market access for 
service industries and for capital remained based on a clear recognition of reciprocity.  Countries 
agreed to a mutual widening of markets, yielding potential advantage to producers and investors 
on all sides.  In this regard, even the new Uruguay Round agreement on the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) only reaffirmed a mutually advantageous form of cooperation 
that had long been in place.  
  For the developing countries, however, the question of reciprocity was more complex and 
uncertain.  Developing countries had earlier sought a special status within the GATT, claiming 
that the industrial countries should reduce their trade barriers to the developing countries in line 
with the principle of non-discrimination, but without reciprocity by the developing countries.  
The exceptional status of the developing countries was taken further in the 1970s when the 
industrial countries introduced the Generalized System of Preferences; and it was also given 
formal recognition during the Tokyo Round in the late 1970s when clauses relating to Special and 
  6Differential Treatment were incorporated into the GATT.  Further, particular groups of 
developing countries have been given additional, preferential access to industrial countries’ 
markets.  The other side of the coin was that the industrial countries felt free to disregard the 
spirit of the GATT whenever it proved politically expedient to do so.  They did not hesitate to 
practice extensive discrimination against specific exports from developing countries, most 
egregiously when they imposed restrictions on textiles and apparel in the 1960s that burgeoned 
into the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). 
  Before the launching of the Uruguay Round in 1986, however, these unequal relations 
had begun to change.  Many developing countries had made progress in modernizing their 
economies through industrialization; and they were all influenced, in varying degree, by the 
worldwide shift in beliefs about economic policy that, among other things, favored more 
outward-oriented growth.  Indeed, several developing countries had unilaterally lowered their 
trade barriers and most had become members of, or sought membership in, the GATT. 
  During and after the Uruguay Round, some “rebalancing” in trade relations began to take 
place, though it remains highly controversial whether the negotiations satisfied the condition of 
reciprocity.  While developing countries generally did not fully reciprocate in tariff reductions, 
they agreed, in principle, to the opening up of market access to service industries and to 
limitations on the conditions that could be imposed on foreign direct investment (FDI).  These 
were both concessions that appeared to largely benefit producers and investors in the industrial 
countries.  When the new international rules on IPRs were added to the list, the grounds for 
questioning the reciprocal character of the negotiations appeared substantial to many observers. 
  But there is another and less obvious reason why the idea of reciprocity has lost much of 
its clarity.  This is because the Uruguay Round also gave weight to rules – like those relating to 
subsidies and FDI – that, while certainly bound up with issues of market access, also impinged 
directly on domestic policies and practices.  Together with revisions of domestic laws and 
regulations required by the liberalization of the service industries, these initiated what some 
  7commentators have dubbed the “deeper integration” of markets.  They marked the beginning of a 
new development in trade relations in which actual or proposed trade rules could penetrate more 
deeply into the management of national economic and social affairs.
3  Some of the issues later 
raised by the industrial countries for inclusion in the Doha Round negotiations have borne the 
same stamp.   
  While some developing countries may have tacitly accepted these changing rules, others 
have voiced serious misgivings. As in all countries, the desire to protect entrenched domestic 
interests for internal political reasons has doubtless been an active consideration.  But there are 
other, more valid reasons.  Of central concern are the limitations that these changes imposed on 
the development policies that these countries were pursuing.  Since the early years after WWII, 
most developing country governments have used their powers to establish national firms in non-
traditional sectors. They have created investment opportunities for the domestic business 
community (or political elite) through the use of a range of measures including tariffs, subsidies 
in one form or another, quantitative restrictions, and limitations on foreign investment.  There is 
considerable concern accordingly that the freedom to pursue such development policies has been 
jeopardized by some of the rules adopted in the Uruguay Round.   
Some of these new rules were apparently extending the principle of national treatment 
beyond its traditional, and limited, meaning through added restrictions on the freedom of 
governments to discriminate in favor of national firms by means of domestic measures.  In effect, 
the leading industrialized country governments were collectively seeking to create an 
international framework of rules and procedures within which their own markets could be more 
closely integrated with each other.  It was, in more popular terms, to establish a “level playing 
field” in which the firms of each country would ideally compete everywhere on the same terms. 
The incipient framework drew on the ideas that guided the industrialized countries in the 
                                                 
3 See Whitman (2004) for a discussion of the issues involving the deeper integration of markets, including 
pertinent references to the writings of Sylvia Ostry and others. 
  8management of their own domestic markets, and in particular, on those of the leading power, the 
United States. 
  This represents a new paradigm in trade relations.  It is advocated by those who lean 
toward a cosmopolitan view of the global economy, one that sees the emergence of an 
increasingly integrated world market governed by common rules that regulate transactions in this 
single market.  It is a view that coincides with exporting interests, and especially those of 
multinational corporations.  But almost all countries also have national aims that they are not 
willing to surrender in order to accommodate their trading partners.  Some of these aims are 
rightly dismissed by cosmopolitan proponents as essentially being obstructive rent-seeking 
activities, agricultural protectionism and antidumping measures being cases in point. But, it needs 
to be understood that there is a global diversity in aims and policies.  Many of these aims and 
policies have deep roots in national societies, and it can be argued that they should therefore be 
afforded legitimacy.  This is a reality that is reflected in the historically more familiar view of the 
world as composed of separate nation states, each with its own national market.  In this view, it is 
for each country to decide – in the light of its own social norms and economic aims – how far it 
wants to adjust its own domestic laws and practices in order to accommodate its trading partners 
and to gain a comparable adjustment from them.
4  It is a view that has long been the basis for 
achieving the reciprocal liberalization of trade. 
III.  Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO)
5 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 1995.   It is the successor to, and 
incorporates within it, the GATT, which as already noted, was a treaty among Western market 
economies that came into effect at the end of WWII.  In the GATT, member countries agreed to 
rules about when they may increase trade barriers, especially tariffs, in order to prevent them 
from using trade policies that harm other countries.  The GATT was also a forum for negotiation 
                                                 
4 See Whalley (2005) for a perceptive analysis of how different social values might interact and change in 
the process of increasing international economic interdependence. 
5 This section has been adapted from Deardorff and Stern (2002). 
  9to reduce trade barriers.    As noted in Table 1, the GATT oversaw eight rounds of multilateral 
trade negotiations, culminating in the Uruguay Round that created the WTO.  As a consequence, 
as already noted in Figure 1, average tariffs on manufactures have been reduced to relatively low 
levels. The WTO also took on issues that GATT had not covered, including trade in services, 
tariffication in agriculture, and intellectual property protection.  In 2001, the WTO inaugurated a 
further round of multilateral trade negotiations that was entitled the Doha Development Agenda 
in ostensible recognition of the objective of focusing trade liberalization to enhance the interests 
of the developing countries.  The WTO is thus designed to continue the move toward freer trade 
that was started under the GATT, but the so-called Doha Round is currently in limbo because of 
unresolved differences in the negotiating positions of its member countries. 
The most important change in the WTO, compared to the GATT, may be its dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM).  The GATT permitted countries to complain against other 
countries for violating its rules.  Each complaint was handled by a “panel” of experts who issued 
a report that, if adopted unanimously by GATT members, would require the offending party to 
either change its behavior or be subject to sanctions. However, unanimity meant that the 
offending party could block a report, in effect giving every country veto power over findings 
against itself.  The surprise was that this ever worked at all, which it did. 
The WTO reversed this bias, requiring instead a unanimous decision to block a report, 
and it therefore made the DSM much more effective.  It also made other improvements, including 
the right to appeal.  The various stages of the DSM are depicted in Figure 2.  The intent was to 
provide viable enforcement for WTO rules, and it appears to have worked.  Thus, it can be seen 
in Figure 3 that the DSM has been used much more often than under the GATT.  The numbers of  
DSM complaints and dispositions from 1995-2005 are shown in Figure 4.  The percentages by 
complaining and responding country are indicated in Figure 5.  The United States and the 
European Community have been involved in the most DSM actions, but several other countries  
have been major users as well.  Just as important, large countries such as the United States, have 
  10stopped going outside the GATT with their most important complaints.   
Inevitably, however, the DSM has not worked to everyone’s satisfaction.  The WTO 
restricts policies that harm other countries, not only deliberately, but also inadvertently, as when 
policy restricts the options of another country’s citizens.  A contentious example was the 
“shrimp-turtle” case.  A U.S. law protected sea turtles from death in the nets of shrimp fishermen 
by prohibiting imports of shrimp caught without “turtle exclusion devices” (TEDs).  Since it is 
impossible to tell from looking at a shrimp how it was caught, the law restricted imports from 
certain countries.  These countries took the case to the WTO, which decided against the United 
States.  In effect, this decision struck down U.S. law, an intrusion into sovereignty that offended 
environmentalists and others.  There have been other, similar examples.
6 
The potential of the WTO to intrude in national affairs was also increased by its 
expanded coverage.  This can be seen in Table 2, which indicates the scope of the WTO regime.  
The GATT was limited to trade in goods, even excluding certain sectors such as agriculture and 
textiles/apparel.  The latter was covered instead by the GATT-sanctioned Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA), restricting developing-country exports to developed countries.  The WTO 
changed all that, or at least it promised to.  The Uruguay Round scheduled the elimination of the 
MFA, though the most difficult liberalization was postponed (“backloaded”) ten years.  First 
steps were also taken in agriculture, converting existing NTBs to tariffs (tariffication) so as later 
to negotiate them downward.  And trade in services was covered in a parallel agreement to the 
GATT, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
The WTO also expanded to new areas.  Most prominent is the TRIPS (Trade Related 
Intellectual Property) Agreement covering intellectual property – primarily patents, copyrights, 
and trademarks.  In addition, the WTO includes (as the GATT had before, actually) some small 
                                                 
6 The details of the DSM cases and decisions can be found on the WTO official website [www.wto.org].  
See also Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins (2006) for a description and analysis of a number of important 
case disputes involving the United States, including hormone-treated beef, bananas, film, steel, cotton, and 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
  11ways that countries may use trade policies for environmental purposes.  However, the one area – 
much discussed – where the WTO has not been extended is labor standards and rights.  This is the 
case despite the pressures from many interest groups in developed countries favoring the use of 
trade policies for this purpose.  The resistance from the developing world, including corporations 
who employ labor there, has prevented labor standards from even being discussed in the WTO. 
Whom Does It Help or Hurt? 
With its expanded role, the WTO potentially affects many groups.  But fundamentally it is still, 
like the GATT, a force for increased trade, and thus for much of globalization.  The WTO has 
not, yet, done much on international capital movements, although its agreement on financial 
services will lower transactions costs for movements of financial capital.  But it has done much to 
facilitate international trade.  Those who gain and lose from the WTO, then, are also those who 
gain and lose from globalization.   
That is, as in the case of globalization, the reduction of trade barriers will bring about the 
increased movement of goods and capital across national borders and international markets will 
become more integrated.  Participants in domestic markets will find themselves either competing 
with their counterparts in foreign markets, taking advantage of them, or both.  Consumers in 
particular will stand to gain.  That is, everybody in a country stands to gain from trade in their 
role as consumers of goods and services.  For many reasons – including comparative advantage, 
economies of scale, increased competition, and access to a greater variety of products – a 
country’s average consumer, with an average income, is better off with trade than without.
7  That 
is, the average person’s income will buy a larger, more desirable bundle of goods and services 
with trade than without, increasing their material standard of living.  This proposition, called the 
                                                 
7 This statement is literally correct only if the word “average” refers to the simple arithmetic mean of 
incomes – that is, total income divided by total population.  Given the very skewed distribution of income, 
this does not necessarily mean that the majority of consumers are better off, since in principle the rich could 
enjoy a disproportionate share of the gains.  However, in practice the vast majority of consumers are likely 
to gain from trade, the losers being only the small minority whose incomes fall disproportionately due to 
direct competition from imports. 
  12“gains from trade,” has been shown theoretically in all sorts of economic models.  With only a 
few exceptions – which economists generally view as unlikely to reverse the broad conclusion in 
practice – it applies to all countries comparing trade to not trading at all.  The argument extends 
to further degrees of openness, as well as to other kinds of openness such as international 
movement of capital.  Thus, the fundamental case for trade liberalization and globalization is that 
it raises the average person’s standard of living.
8 
While this benefit applies to the average person, with average income, income is not in 
reality equally distributed, and increased trade may not benefit everybody.  A fundamental result 
of trade theory, the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) Theorem, identifies winners and losers from trade in 
terms of the national abundance and scarcity of factors of production, such as labor and capital, 
from which they derive their incomes.  Owners of abundant factors tend to gain more than 
average from trade, while owners of scarce factors are made unambiguously worse off..
9   More 
general models allow for additional sources of gain from trade and suggest that even owners of 
scarce factors may gain, in which case SS says only that they gain less than average.  But the 
possibility remains that they actually lose. 
So trade theory tells us that, indeed, there may be losers as well as gainers from trade 
liberalization and globalization.  Who are the losers?  In countries like the United States, with its 
abundance of capital, education, and land, the scarce factor is clearly labor.  It is not that the 
United States has a small labor force. Rather, the United States has even more of everything else.  
In this relative sense, the United States is especially scarce in those workers without a great deal 
of education, what can simply be called labor.  Therefore, international trade theory tells us that 
the group in the United States most likely to lose from trade liberalization and globalization, or at 
                                                 
8 This conclusion is, strictly speaking, theoretically valid only for countries that are too small to influence 
world prices with changes in their trade.  For large countries, the “optimal tariff” is positive, allowing them 
to benefit somewhat at the world’s expense.  While this argument might apply to a country the size of the 
United States, U.S. levels of protection in sectors where it is highest are well above this “optimal” level, 
and in any case this argument for protection bears scant resemblance to what opponents of trade 
liberalization and globalization have in mind. 
9The formal details are provided in Stolper and Samuelson (1941). 
  13best to gain less than everyone else, is labor.  This is hardly a surprise.  The opposition to trade 
liberalization and globalization by organized labor in the United States shows that they are well 
aware of this.  The surprise may be that economists, who tend to favor trade, would agree.   
It follows from this also that trade may increase income inequality in advanced countries.  
Because labor has lower income than those with income from other sources, and because trade 
lowers the relative wage, it may make the poor relatively poorer.  Leaving aside the legitimate 
question of whether an increased return to some other factors, such as the return to education, 
may actually increase the opportunity to escape poverty by becoming skilled, it is possible that, in 
the short run at least, trade liberalization and globalization may increase inequality in rich 
countries like the United States.  In fact, there are empirical studies that suggest that increased 
trade may account for a portion (although much less than half) of the increased inequality 
observed in the United States since 1980. 
Why, then, is it claimed that there are gains from trade?  The reasoning derives from the 
confidence based on both theory and experience that the winners gain more than the losers lose, 
enough so that policy could potentially compensate them, leaving everyone better off.  In the long 
run, with some mobility across population groups and with programs to permit the whole 
population to share in the country’s income, most people can expect to be better off with 
increased trade than without.
10 
SS also applies to developing countries, but in these cases typically the scarce factor is 
different.  Being relatively poor, developing countries can be viewed as the mirror image of the 
United States, with labor abundant and most other factors scarce, especially capital and education.  
These belong to the elite, who therefore lose from trade, according to SS.  Labor in developing 
countries can be expected to gain.  Since labor in developing countries is far poorer than labor in 
developed countries, increased trade and globalization can be expected to reduce income 
                                                 
10 Also in the long run, economic well-being depends most on how rapidly countries grow.  Here the role of 
trade is less well understood, but in recent decades countries have grown more rapidly with trade than 
without.   
  14inequality worldwide, even while it may increase inequality within rich countries. 
Are there other gainers and losers from trade, besides the owners of abundant and scarce 
factors?  Yes, and many of them are obvious.  Due to trade, some industries expand and others 
contract.  Many people are invested in “industry specific” capital, human and/or physical, in 
particular industries – skills and equipment that are useful only within an industry.  These people 
gain or lose along with their industries, and some can find the basis for their livelihoods 
destroyed, a serious cost that public policy can usually only partially acknowledge.  For some, 
these costs can continue for months or even years, as they relocate, retrain, reinvest, and 
otherwise readjust.  Others, especially those later in life, may never recover.  International trade 
theory does not in any way dismiss these costs as unimportant or even as smaller than other gains.  
Economists therefore usually favor only gradual movement toward freer trade, so that these 
adjustment costs can be accommodated within the routine ups and downs of markets.
11 
Nonetheless owners of contracting-industry specific factors are a major source of concern 
in response to increased trade and globalization.  These include, for example, American owners 
and workers in textile and apparel firms, factory workers in developing countries who have been  
employed during the periods when self-sufficient industrialization was being pursued, and 
Mexico’s small farmers of corn (maize) who now compete with more productive farms in the 
Midwest United States.  These are only a few of the many groups throughout the world who have 
reason to be concerned about the effects of increased trade and globalization because of their 
dependence on industry-specific factors. 
It is not only whole industries that expand and contract due to trade and globalization.  
Within an industry, particular firms also win and lose, and firms that have prospered in a 
protected domestic market may not be the same ones that do well in a globalized economy.  
                                                 
11 In Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1992), for example, the employment reallocation effects of the NAFTA 
for the United States were estimated and found to be much smaller than the normal turnover within U.S. 
industries in any one year. 
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process is underway, particular firms will try to speed it up or slow it down, depending on how 
well they deal with its competitive pressure. 
This discussion of gains and losses by particular firms and by specific factors is 
appropriate primarily to the short run, because in the longer run, people relocate, retrain, and 
otherwise readjust to changing circumstances.  Gains and losses to abundant and scarce factors, in 
contrast, last longer, continuing even after factors have moved from failing firms and contracting 
industries into new and expanding ones.  However, this is not the end of the story.  Over even 
longer time horizons, the total of a country’s factors changes with economic growth.  It is 
reasonable to ask, then, who gains and loses from trade in the very long run, as sizes of countries 
and their rates of economic growth may change. 
An easy answer to who gains and loses from trade in the very long run is:  “Not us.”  
Keynes said that “in the long run we are all dead,” and he was probably right.  Thus, whoever 
may be the long run gainers and losers from trade liberalization and globalization, they will be 
subsequent generations, not the present generation.  That makes it more difficult to predict how 
future generations will fare, since we know less about them than we do about the present 
generation.  In a dynamic economy like the United States, the owners of tomorrow’s capital, land, 
and human capital may not be the descendents of those who own these factors today.  Therefore, 
even without economic growth, the best bet for helping future generations is to maximize total 
income.  Trade liberalization and globalization do exactly that.  Therefore, there may be a basis 
for confidence that “everyone” in future generations will benefit from it as trade and globalization 
continue to grow and spread. 
Allowing for economic growth, this conclusion becomes still more likely, although the 
theoretical basis for it is less certain than the aggregate gains from trade liberalization in the 
shorter run.  Economists do not in fact have a solid theoretical grasp of how trade affects 
economic growth, perhaps because growth itself is less well understood than the economics of 
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trade may interact with growth.  Some predict only that trade permits a country to grow larger 
than it otherwise would; others suggest that trade lets countries grow faster indefinitely.  And 
there are also models where trade may be bad for growth. 
But empirical evidence is much clearer that trade and globalization are good for growth.   
Since the end of WWII, most countries that restricted their trade failed to grow 
significantly, while those that stressed export expansion have done much better.  After a few 
successful countries demonstrated the benefits of trade for growth – especially the “four tigers” of 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan – other countries opened their markets and 
grew faster as well.  This process has had setbacks, but few economists today doubt that open 
markets are beneficial for growth, even if the underlying conceptual connections are not entirely 
clear. 
If so, the case is even stronger that, in the very long run, entire populations gain from 
increase trade and globalization.  Those who are hurt in the short run may lose relative to others.  
But because they will have a smaller slice of a larger pie, they may well be better off absolutely.  
That will surely be true if increased trade and globalization permit countries not just to grow to 
larger size, but to continue growing at faster rates indefinitely.  In that case, present and future 
generations will benefit. 
  With its expanded role, the WTO will thus affect many groups.  But 
fundamentally it is still, like the GATT, a force for increased trade, and thus for much of 
globalization.  Thus, the preceding discussion about gains and losses to abundant and scarce 
factors, to industry-specific factors, and to factors unable to move or retrain applies to the WTO.  
Because the WTO now extends to previously excluded sectors – textiles, apparel, agriculture, and 
services – those principles will apply especially strongly to them.  For example, developed-
country textile workers, who have been protected for decades, have particular reason now to be 
concerned with the end of the MFA, whereas developing-country textile workers in some 
  17countries may have corresponding reason to be hopeful.
12 
More generally, however, the WTO has an important institutional role beyond just 
fostering trade:   to constrain countries from using trade policies that will hurt each other and 
themselves.  Without such constraints, two things would guide countries’ uses of trade policies.  
First, large countries would be able to use policies to gain at small countries’ expense.  Second, 
weak and misguided governments would be able to use policies to benefit themselves and their 
“cronies,” and domestic political forces would likely lead them to do so.  The WTO, with its rules 
and its DSM for enforcement, helps to prevent both of these unfortunate outcomes..  It protects 
weak countries from strong countries, and also weak countries from themselves.  This is true not 
only for small countries, but especially for countries that are poor.  Thus, even though the WTO 
was mostly designed by rich countries and even corporations, its greatest beneficiaries may well 
be in the developing world. 
Who loses from the WTO?  Again, some of the losers are simply those who lose most 
from trade, and here the most vulnerable are again the relatively unskilled workers in developed 
countries.  It makes perfect sense that organized labor in developed countries should be skeptical 
of the benefits from the WTO, for theory predicts that greater trade will indeed hurt their 
members, at least relatively.   
Aside from the foregoing, the rules of the WTO will also hurt those who would wish to 
break them.  If there are large countries that seek to use their economic size at other countries’ 
expense, then they will be frustrated by the WTO.  Fortunately, there is little evidence in recent 
decades that the most powerful countries have sought to do this.  More likely losers, therefore, are 
those who seek to use trade policy for other legitimate purposes but run afoul of the WTO, as in 
                                                 
12 For owners of textile firms in developing countries, it is more complicated.  Developed-country firms 
may move production abroad.  Some developing-country firms have prospered, using export licenses under 
the MFA to make extraordinary profits.  But with the elimination of the MFA and increased competition 
especially from such large, low-cost producers as China and India, many developing-country firms and 
workers will face difficulties in adjusting. 
 
  18the shrimp-turtle case.  In this case, those who seek to halt environmental degradation naturally 
wish to use trade policies to pursue their aims, since few other policies work across borders.  Yet 
to do so risks violating the strictures of the WTO.  Environmentalists have therefore sometimes 
been hamstrung by WTO rules, and they believe that they – or the environment – are hurt by the 
WTO. 
It is true that the WTO makes the objectives of environmentalists harder to attain.   
Policies impose costs, and some are borne by other countries when one country unilaterally uses 
trade policies for environmental purposes.  The WTO gives those costs more weight than if 
countries could act alone.  This means that a lower level of environmental protection will result 
when these costs are factored in.  This is as it should be, however, since global policy decisions 
should be based on global costs and benefits, including all aspects of all peoples’ lives, not just 
the environment or one country.  Environmentalists, whose role is narrower, will indeed make 
less progress when their interests are balanced against those of others. 
Environmentalists might say, “Fine, but the WTO does not just balance other interests 
against the environment; it rules the environment out of court.  All we want is for environmental 
concerns to be heard in the WTO.” In fact, the WTO does include several environmental clauses, 
so even here the question is one of balance.  How much role should environmental concerns play 
in justifying trade policies?  Arguably, the current system has not done badly.  The problem with 
using trade policies for environmental and other purposes is that they too easily push the cost onto 
others.  The WTO has forced their advocates to find fairer ways to achieve those purposes.  For 
example, the shrimp-turtle dispute led, more quietly, to shrimp fishermen being equipped with 
TEDs at developed country expense.  It could be said that this was the right solution all along. 
There are other issues, besides the environment, whose advocates wish to use trade 
policies, including human rights and labor standards.  For both, the United States especially has 
used trade policies in the past to deny trade preferences for some developing country trading 
partners that are allegedly pursuing abusive labor policies.  Some U.S. groups view the WTO as 
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but, as with the environment, as the WTO interferes with policies that would otherwise be 
available to pursue these ends, the ends themselves will not be attained as fully as some groups 
desire. 
In the case of human rights, the WTO does permit some use of trade policies, such as the 
economic sanctions that were used against Rhodesia in 1965 and against South Africa in 1985. 
Formally, these were permitted under GATT Article XXI, based on actions under the United 
Nations Charter for purposes of peace and security.
13  The WTO does not permit unilateral 
sanctions for human rights, however. 
In the case of labor standards and labor rights, the issue is more complex, partly because 
it is so difficult to separate the moral from the economic, and partly because of different views of 
what labor standards mean economically.
14  Some labor standards, such as the prohibition of 
slave labor and exploitative child labor, are clearly moral issues.  Others, such as a minimum 
wage, are economic.  And still others, such as working conditions and child labor with the 
approval of caring parents, are somewhere in between.  It is hard to say where to draw the line 
and who should draw it.
15 
Economically, most labor standards affect the cost of labor, even when not explicitly 
about wages.  But their effects depend on how one believes that wages are determined.  From the 
perspective of competitive markets, which guides most economists on this issue, labor standards 
are mostly about the remuneration of labor in poor versus rich countries, and higher labor 
standards in the former primarily benefit the latter, putting developing country workers out of 
work.  Another view, however, is that all labor remuneration is at the expense of capital, so that 
higher labor standards merely reduce profits.  This second view makes most sense if employers 
                                                 
13 See Jackson and Davey (1986, p. 917). 
14 The line between human rights and labor standards is not always clear.  The right to organize and a safe 
workplace are both on most lists of labor standards, but they might also be regarded as human rights. 
15 For more on labor standards, see Brown and Stern (2007). 
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undermine.  But not everyone believes market economics, and there are plenty of subscribers to 
this second view among opponents of the WTO.  In their view, by excluding labor standards as a 
basis for trade policy, the WTO helps capitalists and hurts workers, everywhere.  But modern 
economics suggests that only developed-country workers may be hurt, while the true 
beneficiaries of the WTO are the developing-country workers for whom labor standards are 
ostensibly meant to help. 
The latter view is voiced prominently by most economists and by most leaders of 
developing countries.  They perceive labor standards, when enforced by trade sanctions, as thinly 
disguised protection for developed-country labor.  The WTO thus excludes labor standards as part 
of its broader role of protecting the weak from the strong.  Thus, at the 1996 GATT Ministerial 
Meeting in Singapore, it was decided that issues of labor standards should be handled in the 
International Labor Organization, which was established in the 1920s with the express purpose of 
improving labor rights and working conditions but without resort to the use of trade sanctions to 
punish alleged violations of worker rights.   
Other Objections to the WTO 
Even among those who conclude that it is appropriate for the WTO to limit its jurisdiction on 
issues of the environment and labor standards, however, the WTO does nonetheless have some 
limitations.  One is its lack of transparency.  The proceedings of the DSM panels are generally 
closed and make only limited use of information from non-government sources.  Some observers 
regard this mechanism as non-democratic, and they fear its capture by corporations with financial 
stakes in the outcome.  They would like interested NGOs to be able to provide more input to the 
process, and perhaps to have the panelists themselves selected by a process that NGOs could 
influence. 
The complaint about non-democratic procedures is ironic, however, since the WTO 
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self-appointed special interests.  More important, however, is a concern from developing 
countries, that opening the DSM to greater public scrutiny and influence would cause its capture 
by precisely these special interests, at developing-country expense.  Nonetheless, even defenders 
of the WTO recognize that the DSM’s procedures may be counterproductive.  It has thus become 
increasingly common in DSM cases to permit NGOs and others to file “friend of the court 
briefs.”  Some observers also argue that a more permanent body should replace the panels 
themselves, instead of being assembled case-by-case.  If so, then greater public input to selection 
of that body might be natural. 
A further concern has long been that a few rich countries dominate the WTO, developing 
countries having little role.  This is true in spite of – or even because of – its formal reliance on 
consensus.  With 150 member countries, however, consensus is not practical, and therefore a 
smaller group has typically sought agreement among themselves, thereafter coming to the larger 
group for approval.  This smaller group, sometimes referred to as the “green room group” after 
the room in which they have sometimes met at WTO headquarters in Geneva, has been assembled 
on an ad hoc basis by the Director General and has included both developed and developing 
countries based on their interest in the issues being addressed.   However, many developing 
countries – especially smaller ones – have been excluded and not formally represented, not by 
design because there was no design, but by default.  Exactly how to change this aspect of WTO 
governance is not clear, but it requires careful consideration. 
As already noted, a common objection to the WTO is that it overrules domestic laws.  
This is true, for that is its purpose.  The GATT was a treaty among countries to prevent them 
from using certain laws and policies that would adversely affect each other.  The WTO continues 
that purpose.  However, while the original GATT dealt only with tariffs, over time the 
GATT/WTO has expanded to many other policies whose main purposes are not international.  
Critics object that the WTO undermines domestic policies, not just tariffs.  Presumably, countries 
  22might well want to reconsider membership if they find WTO rules too onerous, but to date no 
countries have found it in their interest to leave the organization.
16 
A final concern of many WTO critics is that it is dominated by large corporations.  This 
is true and probably inevitable, since it is large corporations that do most trade.  Corporations 
have both the incentive and the resources to influence policies, and they do, both within countries 
and internationally.  This means that the WTO has elements that would not be there without 
corporate lobbying, and some of these elements are undesirable.  For example, antidumping 
statutes are economically nonsensical and pernicious, and yet the GATT has always permitted 
them, for the obvious reason that many corporations want them.  More recently, in response to 
corporate lobbying the Uruguay Round added intellectual property rights to the WTO, in spite of 
strong resistance from developing countries that ultimately was overcome by the promise of 
market opening in textiles and apparel. 
The WTO, then, is not a perfect organization.  It could be improved, but many of its 
flaws will inevitably remain, because they are there in response to political realities.  Overall, it 
seems clear that the WTO serves an extremely useful purpose, and that it serves it surprisingly 
well. 
One indication that the WTO is not too far off the mark comes from its opponents.   
Although they share unhappiness with the WTO, some say that it does too much, others that it 
does too little.  Environmentalists usually complain that it does too much, ruling against national 
                                                 
16 A troubling feature of the WTO for some countries is imports may not be restricted based upon the 
process by which they were produced.  The WTO permits countries to exclude goods deemed harmful to 
health or the environment, for example, but only based on observable characteristics of the products 
themselves.  In practice, countries often want to exclude imports that were produced by a process that has 
harmed the environment, has violated labor standards or human rights, has adverse health consequences for 
consumers, or may be otherwise undesirable.  These are often legitimate concerns, and if the process could 
be inferred from a product characteristic at the border, the WTO might permit their exclusion.  However, 
the problem with exclusion based on process is that there is no way to observe the process at the border 
when goods are being imported.  Countries must therefore in practice exclude imports based on where they 
were produced, excluding all imports from any country that does not effectively ban the offending process.  
Permitting restrictions based on process runs the risk of imposing particular production techniques on 
countries, and thus of undermining their comparative advantage.  For these reasons, the WTO has 
maintained its position that process-based import restrictions are unacceptable. 
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policies can proceed unhindered.  Labor activists, on the other hand, complain that it does too 
little, not enforcing labor standards around the world.  They want the WTO to take on more 
issues, and interfere more with national policies. 
IV.  Issues of National Sovereignty and the Boundaries of the WTO
17 
As already noted, world trade liberalization made great strides after WWII on the basis of the two 
major pillars of multilateralism:  reciprocity and non-discrimination (MFN).  Until the Uruguay 
Round (1986-93), the periodic GATT negotiations focused on the reduction of external trade 
barriers to make gains in reciprocal and non-discriminatory market access.  During and since the 
UR, these underpinnings of the multilateral system have lost their primacy.  In the course of the 
UR, there was an extension of trade rules, directed most notably toward the liberalization of 
domestic markets for services and investment and toward the protection of IPRs.  Following the 
conclusion of the UR, efforts were made to include the so-called Singapore issues of competition, 
investment, government procurement, and trade facilitation on the agenda of the WTO Doha 
Development Agenda negotiations.  Attempts have also been made to incorporate labor and 
environmental standards into the WTO.  All of these developments reflect the idea, not simply of 
promoting trade liberalization among separate national markets, but of furthering global market 
integration through the convergence of national market regulations.  In some degree, the 
breakaway from non-discrimination through the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) in 
the past decade only accentuates the movement away from trade liberalization based on 
reciprocal gains in market access. 
It can be argued that the existing and proposed extensions of the WTO into domestic rule 
making may be misguided.  That is, the central role of the WTO should be viewed as facilitating 
commercial relations among its member nations.  It is by no means clear therefore that the WTO 
                                                 
17 This section has been adapted from Brown and Stern (2006). 
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some idealized model of how a global economic system should work.  The point is that there are 
boundaries to the extent to which WTO disciplines can, or should, superimpose themselves on 
commercial conduct in national markets.   
The Boundaries to the WTO Regime 
To clarify the scope of the WTO, Table 2 provides a categorization of the various actual or 
proposed disciplines of the WTO regime.  These include:  (1) core disciplines; (2) disciplines that 
may require modification to take legitimate national interests into account; (3) preferential trading 
arrangements that do not inhibit global trade; (4) national regulations involving health, safety, and 
consumer protection; and (5) national regulations that lie wholly beyond WTO boundaries.   
While not included explicitly, allowance needs to be made under the foregoing 
disciplines/boundaries for provision of Special and Differential treatment to low income or least 
developed countries. 
In considering the WTO boundaries, there are two conditions to bear in mind:  (1) the 
positive economic nationalism that legitimately motivates most governments to pursue policies 
that are sincerely believed will improve the material well-being of their populations and sustain 
their social cohesion; and (2) the institutions surrounding national markets that are embedded in 
social mores and the particular structure of business organization.  When WTO rules and 
procedures are pushed beyond the boundaries set by these conditions, they may sour trade 
relations and erode the general consent to the core disciplines on which the effectiveness of the 
WTO rests. 
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interpretation of these conditions,
18 addressing subsequently how the WTO “playing field” may 
be best delineated and the role of the WTO in dealing with preferential trading arrangements.   
Economic Nationalism 
Economic nationalism is widely used as a pejorative term.  It manifests itself frequently in 
international economic relations and policies and is usually rightly denounced by trade specialists 
as a regression into mercantilism.  There is a long history of beggar-thy-neighbor policies in 
international economic affairs, and the guardians of economic rationality are justly  wary of 
nationalist rhetoric.  But that should not blind them to the reality that nationalist sentiment is a 
powerful force that also has positive economic consequences.  The great revolution in rising 
expectations, which first began within some Western countries in the 18th and 19th centuries, has 
since swept around the world; and politically vocal people everywhere expect that their own 
national governments will take measures to improve their material well being.  Though the great 
majority of countries now have capitalist systems, beliefs about how governments could best 
accomplish this purpose vary widely; and they have changed within countries over time.  But 
what has remained ever present is the responsibility that peoples place on their governments – as 
the highest political authority in their societies – to seek gains in national well being. As 
illustrated below, such economic nationalism sets limits that have to be respected in multilateral 
rule making. 
Domestic Subsidies and Industrial Policies 
Among today’s established industrial countries, governments broadly see themselves as fulfilling 
their responsibility if they are able to maintain technological leadership – at least in some sectors 
– or, at worst, not fall behind other countries in the endless race toward economic betterment.  
                                                 
18 Issues of delimiting the WTO boundaries are also addressed in Hoekman (2002, 2004, 2005) and 
Sutherland et al. (2004, esp. 61-72). 
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prices, they see their responsibility largely as the support of education, provision of infrastructure, 
and promotion of general scientific and technological research and development.  Such economic 
nationalism has been reflected in the WTO mainly through its rules on subsidies.  While 
government subsidies to individual firms or industries are often seen as contraventions of “fair” 
trade because they may distort market prices, subsidies of general research and development are 
not so viewed.  The lines between specific and general subsidies are, however, not always clear-
cut.  For example, in very large-scale industries like the aircraft industry, EU subsidization of the 
Airbus and U.S. defense procurement favoring Boeing have been an ongoing source of bilateral 
friction.  Yet, until recently, the EU and U.S. policies have broadly remained in place, although 
they are now under challenge in the WTO dispute settlement procedure, albeit with an uncertain 
outcome.  Other manifestations of economic nationalism stem from cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions that may threaten the independence of national corporations regarded as “national 
champions.”  But they have so far not been constrained in this area by the WTO since it has no 
agreement on competition policy.   
Most developing country governments have been no less powerfully motivated by 
economic nationalism.  In the earlier post-WWII years, indeed, the sense of national pride – 
enhanced by new won independence – occasioned widespread nationalization of foreign 
enterprises and stressed the development of nationally-owned enterprises.  While most 
governments have since shed their hostility toward foreign investment, they have not lost their 
determination to foster the expansion of a rising indigenous industrial sector.  Countries that have 
made substantial progress in industrialization have generally made extensive use of policies 
intended to provide inducements to, and financial and technical support for, national firms to 
encourage expansion of production and introduction of new products and processes.  By such 
means, they have sought to benefit from learning spillovers, and to overcome coordination 
failures that might otherwise impede their economic growth.  However, such policies – pursued 
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the circumstances – are perhaps not consistent with the rules of the GATT/WTO as these rules 
now stand.  But it is noteworthy that national policies have for the most part been considered to 
lie within the purview of governments and have not been challenged in the GATT/WTO.  Efforts 
to restrict domestic subsidies that constrain industrial policies should therefore be carefully 
circumscribed in the WTO.   
TRIMS and TRIPS   
In the UR negotiations, agreements on “trade related” investment measures (TRIMS) and IPR 
(TRIPS) protection were incorporated into the WTO..  These are clear examples of the extension 
of international rule making into areas of domestic policy. 
The TRIMS Agreement fell short of what its sponsors – mainly the United States –
sought. They had hoped for an agreement on foreign investment that, when taken together with 
the GATS (which accorded foreign investors the right of establishment in service industries), 
would succeed in gaining less restricted access to the markets of other countries for their 
corporate investors.  They also hoped that, once their investors had been granted access, such 
foreign investment would enjoy full national treatment.  These aims were not realized.  However, 
developing countries had to accept some restrictions on their freedom to apply conditions on FDI.  
They were no longer permitted to impose local content requirements on foreign enterprises to 
mandate their meeting particular levels of local procurement, or stipulate that foreign enterprises 
meet trade-balancing requirements.  Underlying TRIMS is an evident conflict between the 
legitimate economic nationalism of developing countries in pursuing measures intended to 
advance their own development and the commercial interests of multinational corporations.    
The TRIPS Agreement addresses long-standing issues of foreign piracy and 
counterfeiting of patents, copyrights and trademarks that have always been of concern to the 
owners of these IPRs.  In the earlier stages of their own industrialization, the now industrialized 
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engineering of foreign products and processes were principal means of gaining new technology 
(Chang, 2002).  However, as these countries themselves began to generate technological 
innovations, they acquired an interest in the reciprocal recognition of IPRs.  What TRIPS 
accomplished was an extension of such mutual recognition to all WTO members.  For a great 
many developing countries, however, the element of reciprocity has been largely absent from the 
agreement, since they have had few IPRs for which they might seek recognition abroad.  On the 
other hand, the agreement has restricted their freedom to copy and apply new technologies at will.  
Further, utilization of new technologies patented elsewhere will require payment of royalties or 
fees, implying a transfer of financial resources from poor to rich countries.   
Defenders of the new discipline point to the potentially beneficial development effects.  
Their argument is that, as the rights of patent holders are now more secure, corporations may be 
more willing to set up production in countries where they formerly feared that their patented 
processes would be surreptitiously stolen and copied.  But against this is the check that the 
discipline imposes on the unrestrained transfer of technology.  WTO members have, at least, 
recognized this in the special provisions agreed to in regard to pharmaceutical patents and the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.
19  
It can be argued that the TRIMS and TRIPS Agreements may well lie outside the 
appropriate boundaries for many WTO developing country members.  In my judgment, the 
broader investment measures that were part of the Singapore agenda and that were shelved 
following the September 2003 WTO Cancun Ministerial should be permanently shelved.   
Furthermore, the transition period for TRIPS conformance should be made open ended for 
developing countries until such time as they themselves will benefit – both internally and through 
                                                 
19 A well informed and balanced assessment of IPRs and development is provided in the report of an 
international group of experts appointed by the U.K. government. (Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, 2002). 
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to carry out the enforcement procedures of the Agreement. 
Government Procurement 
In the course of the Tokyo Round in the late 1970s, a plurilateral agreement on government 
procurement was negotiated to become effective in 1981, with a number of industrial country 
signatories.  There are presently 28 signatory governments.  The agreement was designed to make 
the procedures and practices of government procurement more transparent and nondiscriminatory 
as between domestic and foreign suppliers.  The emphasis is on tendering practices and covers 
both designated national and local government entities, with specified threshold values for the 
contracts involved.  While the number of signatory countries has expanded, it is noteworthy that 
comparatively few developing countries have become signatories.  The reason apparently is that 
the procurement agreement is viewed as being overly intrusive in challenging the rights of 
governments to maintain control over the award of contracts and programs for public 
procurement.   
It may be the case that existing procurement policies in many countries are inefficient, 
costly, and subject to rent seeking, so that measures to reform these policies may therefore be in a 
country’s national interest.  But it is not clear why such reform should be carried out under WTO 
auspices, especially since a substantial amount of public procurement may stem from pursuit of a 
variety of social and political objectives and programs that are at the foundations of domestic 
government policies and may only tangentially be trade related.  It is not surprising therefore that 
many developing countries were opposed to inclusion of government procurement, one of the 
Singapore issues, as part of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations.  As in the case of 
investment policies, government procurement was shelved following the Cancun Ministerial 
Meeting..  
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It is obvious that national markets function within a framework of laws, regulations, and  more 
informal, but well embedded, practices; and that the framework differs widely among countries.  
Some obvious forces that account for the differences are the social mores of each country, its 
political institutions, and the particular forms of organization of its firms and industries as its 
capitalist system has evolved. These have never prevented transactions across national frontiers.  
So long as traders share some core similarities in modes of commercial conduct, they have been 
able to trade advantageously with each other.  It has been enough that they share respect for 
private property rights and contractual arrangements, and that they accept some judicial 
procedure for resolving disputes.  But in a world of nation states, traders have also found that the 
differences in laws, institutions and social practices may impede their access to foreign markets.  
This has driven the search in the GATT/WTO for common rules that would ensure greater 
similarity in competitive conditions.  Firms in the leading economic powers have deemed 
dissimilarities from their own national conditions to give rise to “unfair” competition and have 
called for a “level playing field.”  This has been powerfully supported, at the intellectual level, by 
an idealized neo-classical model of markets that presupposes universal institutional conditions 
associated historically with the development of capitalism in the United States or Great Britain. 
There are, however, limits on the extent to which nations can be expected to conform to 
multilaterally established rules that may challenge their own social mores or forms of business 
organization.  To be effectively applied at home, rules have to be compatible with the prevailing 
beliefs and practices within which the domestic market functions.  Rules that are in conflict will 
not be accepted or, if formally accepted, will not be enforced or will be enforced only weakly.  
Certainly, some distinction has to be drawn here between laws, regulations and practices that are 
deeply embedded and those that lie more on the surface or merely benefit rent seekers.   
Cumbersome and outmoded customs procedures, for instance, may not reflect any deeply held 
beliefs, and their reform may be impeded only by bureaucratic inertia.  There is no objective test 
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the WTO that may exceed the appropriate boundaries.   
Competition Policy 
Competition policy is a case in point in which the diversity in forms of business organization 
among countries limits the possibility or desirability of common rules. There are many variants of 
capitalism as it has evolved in the unique political, social, and economic circumstances of each 
country.  Perhaps two of the most striking circumstantial differences are the relations between the 
state and private enterprises and the interrelations among firms themselves.  In most English 
speaking industrial countries, for example, the relationships between private enterprises and 
government have historically been more adversarial and arms length in comparison with the more 
cooperative relations in many other countries.  Likewise, there are many differences in the 
competitive or cooperative relations among firms that are socially regarded as acceptable.  These 
give rise to differences in market practices that foreign producers may see as impediments to 
trade.  
An example is the Structural Impediments Initiative that was prominent in U.S.-Japan 
relations in the 1980s and 1990s, and that involved U.S. pressure on Japan to change long-
standing business practices and institutions that allegedly constrained access of U.S. exports and 
FDI in the Japanese market.  The WTO was involved in two prominent cases dealing with U.S. 
access to Japan’s domestic market in automobiles and film.  The United States decided to drop 
the automobiles complaint and was on the losing side of the WTO dispute settlement decision to 
deny the Kodak film complaint.
20  In retrospect, the U.S. actions may have been ill advised to 
begin with.  It also appears that the Japanese Government instituted measures on its own in 
recognition of the national need for institutional and policy reform in a number of sectors.  
Arguments similar to the foregoing can be applied to developing countries. It can be 
                                                 
20 For an analysis of the Kodak-Fuji film dispute between the United States and Japan, see Devereaux, 
Lawrence, and Watkins (2006, Vol. 2, pp. 143-191). 
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WTO regime.  This was another of the Singapore issues that was shelved following the 
September 2003 WTO Cancun Ministerial Meeting. 
Labor Standards 
Labor standards are another case in point.  As noted in the earlier discussion, there have been 
strong political pressures from organized labor and social activists to seek the incorporation of 
labor standards in the WTO.  But it may suffice to note that the case for inclusion of labor 
standards in the WTO rules, on grounds of economic welfare, is widely regarded as very weak, 
both in logic and empirically.  The best contribution that the WTO can make to raising labor 
standards is accordingly to facilitate the expansion of world trade since, almost everywhere, as 
economic growth has taken place and incomes have risen, working conditions have sooner or 
later improved.   
Nonetheless, the proponents favoring inclusion of labor standards in trade agreements 
have been powerfully reinforced by their claim to the high moral ground in arguing that, whatever 
the economic consequences, it is morally wrong to condone poor labor standards in other 
countries.  No one would contest the right of individuals or groups to advocate the norms of their 
society or to call for economic sanctions when the most egregious violations of human rights are 
being committed.  In the present context, however, the issue is whether industrial nations, by 
virtue of their power, should, as a condition of trade, insist that other countries respect particular 
labor standards that they themselves value and that are interwoven with the levels of individual 
and social well-being, which  thanks to their long history of economic growth, they now enjoy.   
Many developing countries see this demand as presumptuous and politically self-serving, 
as the governments of industrial countries appear to be placating domestic groups that either 
represent sectional interests or are not well informed.  But there is a more pragmatic reason for 
rejection of this position, which is that it is very likely to be ineffective.  The transplant of social 
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in domestic regulations embodying new norms of behavior take place in response to demands 
from coalitions of politically influential groups within the country.  External leverage applied 
through trade threats may possibly tilt the balance in favor of reform, but by itself will rarely 
bring about any lasting change in prevailing social beliefs and practices.  What the inclusion of 
rules about labor standards in the WTO would most likely accomplish is its entrapment in 
disputes about policies that countries regard as wholly domestic affairs.  
Environmental Standards 
The arguments just made concerning labor standards may apply to domestic environmental 
standards, which will depend on prevailing social beliefs and practices and differences in per 
capita incomes between nations.  Just as with labor standards, the determination of environmental 
standards should therefore lie outside the boundaries of the WTO. 
Health and Safety Standards and Consumer Protection 
Another problematic policy area for the WTO is the range of measures that governments may 
design and implement with regard to health and safety standards and consumer protection.  In this 
connection, EU policies regarding imports of hormone-treated beef and products containing 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) provide an apt illustration of the limits of WTO 
policies.
21  The issues here concern the rights of nations to establish their own national health and 
safety standards, including the restriction of imports deemed to contravene national standards.  
Such standards can be and have been used for protectionist purposes, and there may not always 
be a firm scientific basis to warrant certain standards.  But so long as governments believe it is in 
the national interest to protect public health, the right to do so should be respected.  Depending on 
how scientific evidence evolves, governments may then decide over time to moderate their 
                                                 
21 The U.S.-EU WTO disputes hormone-treated beef and GMOs are analyzed in Devereaux, Lawrence, and 
Watkins (2006, Vol. 2, pp. 31-96 and pp. 283-344). 
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accordingly that the rules and decisions of the WTO should not be rigidly applied in cases in 
which public health is at issue, and there is lacking a consensus regarding the available scientific 
evidence for the production and processing of the products involved.  
The Playing Field 
So, if we accept the limits described above, how is the WTO's playing field to be defined?  The 
role of the WTO is to provide a framework in which governments can negotiate and monitor the 
reduction of impediments to trade that serve no larger purpose than the protection of sectional 
interests within individual countries.  Such impediments cannot be legitimately defended on the 
kinds of grounds discussed above.  They serve only to lower economic efficiency within the 
countries in which they are practiced and deprive producers in other countries of wider market 
access. The world abounds in these impediments, and their gradual reduction is the raison d'etre 
of the WTO. Drawing the line between these impediments and those that have larger purposes is 
the task of the WTO rules. 
As already mentioned, agricultural impediments illustrate this point. Even if, for 
example, as the EU, Japan, and other nations assert, the subsidization of agriculture has broad 
social as well as economic aims, it is an inefficient way of accomplishing the social purposes as 
well as meeting economic needs. The economic case against agricultural subsidization as serving  
sectional interests and lowering national efficiency appears to be well founded.  A similar case 
can be made against the resort to antidumping measures that are the policy of choice by 
protectionist interests in developed countries and have become increasingly widespread in 
developing countries. 
Sectional interests are, of course, everywhere and governments are rarely independent of 
them.  For individual governments, trade negotiations based on reciprocity have the advantage 
that they pit export interests against sectional protectionist interests.  Negotiations force 
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the WTO that, in bringing countries together around the negotiating table, pressures are openly 
and internationally placed on protectionist domestic interests.  
Many issues are not clear-cut and rules can never be drawn that are always unambiguous 
or that foresee changing circumstances.  A mechanism for dispute settlement is consequently 
essential, but it should not be called upon to adjudicate on policy issues. Its business is the 
interpretation of existing rules, not the formation of policy.  So, in the rules-making process, it is 
important that new rules should enjoy widespread consent. 
Free Trade Agreements 
We need finally to consider how the WTO boundaries should be defined with respect to  FTAs.   
FTAs often manifest the “real politik” that motivates nation states in pursuing national self-
interest in their external relations.  Many FTAs that have been negotiated involve neighboring 
countries that already trade extensively with each other, so that there has been comparatively little 
trade diversion, except perhaps in some labor-intensive sectors such as textiles and clothing. 
Except for U.S. FTAs, most other FTAs are confined mainly to the bilateral removal of 
tariffs and quotas.  U.S. FTAs are more invasive in seeking to extend the integration of markets to 
cover many non-trade issues and to impose conformity with U.S. institutions and policies.   
Nonetheless, FTA members are still bound by WTO rules, which may help to explain why we 
have not witnessed the formation of major trading blocs as some analysts had postulated might 
occur.  It may be the case furthermore that FTAs are becoming generalized as both large and 
small countries are seeking to expand their arrangements to help offset preferences provided in 
previously negotiated FTAS.  But there are some large countries like Brazil, China, and India that 
are latecomers to the FTA process and are not likely to become partners in FTAs with the major 
industrialized countries.  It may well turn out then that these large developing countries will 
become bulwark supporters of the WTO multilateral system. 
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existing FTAs by expanding FTA membership, thereby moving the trading system closer to 
multilateralism.  It might thus become possible to dispense with the rules of origin and remove 
the distortions that have been created by the many overlapping FTAs that now exist.  Continuing 
pursuit of multilateral trade negotiations will also serve to erode preferential trade margins 
incorporated into FTAs and offer countries greater benefits than they may obtain from FTAs. 
V.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have reviewed the development of the present-day global trading system.  We 
have noted that the success of the GATT system prior to the Uruguay Round (UR) was based on 
the twin pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination.  But during and since the conclusion of the 
UR, there has been a pronounced shift toward the pursuit of conformity in domestic regulatory 
policies and institutions covering a variety of institutions, business practices, and social mores.  It 
can be argued this expansion of the boundaries of the WTO into domestic areas may be 
misguided.   
Countries cooperate with each other through the WTO in order to benefit mutually from 
international specialization.  To this end, they negotiate reductions in trade barriers and agree on 
supporting rules of conduct to verify compliance.  Businesses, after all, have a legitimate concern 
that reductions negotiated on their behalf should not be effectively annulled by domestic 
measures later taken by trading partners.  But this does not mean that the WTO should be taken as 
a vehicle for the dissemination of values or economic beliefs that are not widely shared.  The 
criterion of success for WTO rules is that they should be widely, and willingly, accepted as 
necessary to promote mutually advantageous trade relations.  If this is not so, the cooperation on 
which the system rests is vitiated.
22 
                                                 
22For further elaboration on this point, see Brown and Stern (2005). 
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lie.  But too much energy can be poured unproductively into debate about the boundaries.  Within 
the WTO boundaries, there is great scope for further multilateral action to lower trade barriers 
and widen markets.  There are many trade barriers that do not bear close scrutiny as rational 
measures either from a national or an international viewpoint.  They can neither be defended as 
measures integral to national growth or development policies nor embedded in social values or in 
the long-standing structure of business organization.  Unbiased analysis would reveal that they 
are no more than the abuse of governmental powers to protect special interests. 
But where does the drive to confront these interests and remove the protectionist barriers 
come from?  In recent decades in the developing world, it has come sometimes from governments 
committed to a radical shift in economic policies that have privatized and deregulated at home 
and liberalized external trade.  More generally, over time, in both industrial and developing 
countries, it has come incrementally through pressures from their own export interests to 
negotiate for improvements in market access abroad.  Reciprocity has demanded, however, that 
countries face up to at least some of their own protectionist interests and remove barriers. 
Thus, reciprocity in the reduction of barriers to trade in goods and services remains the 
key to further trade liberalization.  There are many other actions that the WTO can, and does, take 
to facilitate trade and smooth trade relations.  But its task should not be the integration of national 
markets into one grand global market.  By the same token, the rise of FTAs has been eroding the 
principle of non-discrimination.  While market forces and particularly the resistance of some of 
the major emerging economies may gradually result in restoration of respect for non-
discrimination, the WTO could play a key role in convincing the countries that are parties to 
FTAs to change the nature and structure of these arrangements to move the trading system closer 
to the multilateral ideal and to continue pursuit of multilateral trade negotiations that will benefit 
countries even though preferential margins will be eroded. 
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  40Discussion Questions 
 
1.  Define reciprocity and non-discrimination (Most-Favored-Nation/MFN).  What are the 
historical origins of these trade-policy instruments?  What happened to international 
trading relations in the period between WWI and WWII?  What was “conditional” MFN 
as used by the United States and why was this policy changed? 
 
2.  What is globalization?  How it is measured, and how has it changed in the past 
century or more? 
 
3.  Whom does trade liberalization and globalization help or hurt?  What are the static effects 
of trade?  Dynamic effects?  What are the effects of international capital flows?  Other 
effects of trade liberalization and globalization? 
 
4.  What was the purpose of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) after 
WWII?  How well did the GATT achieve its objectives?  How did the WTO come to be 
formed, what are its main activities, and how does it differ from the GATT?  Whom does 
the WTO help or hurt?  What has caused the broadening of the agenda of multilateral 
trade negotiations?  How have developing countries been treated under the GATT and 
WTO?  Why has reciprocity lost much of its clarity? 
 
5.  What is the meaning of a “level playing field” in international trade relations?  What is 
the “cosmopolitan” view of the global economy?  What is the “national sovereignty” 
view? 
 
6.  When and why did U.S. policy shift away from multilateralism towards regional and 
bilateral trade agreements?  The EC and Japan?  Emerging market economies and 
developing economies?  Why haven’t the major industrial countries – United States, EU, 
and Japan – formed competing preferential trading blocs?  Are free trade agreements 
(FTAs) a stumbling block or a positive movement towards global trade liberalization?  
How may FTAs constrain developing countries? 
 
7.  Are the existing and proposed extensions of the WTO into domestic rule making 
misguided?  What are the boundaries or disciplines that comprise the WTO regime?  
What is the significance of economic nationalism and institutions embedded in social 
mores and the structure of business organization?  How do the following issues fit within 
the WTO boundaries:  domestic subsidies and industrial policies; TRIMS and TRIPS; 
government procurement; competition policy; labor standards; environmental standards; 
and health and safety standards and consumer protection? 
 
8.  How should the WTO “playing field” be defined?  Should agricultural protection, 
antidumping, and other protectionist actions be dealt with in the WTO negotiations and 
rule making?  What is the role of WTO dispute settlement?  How should the proliferation 
of FTAs be addressed?   
 
9.  How successful has trade liberalization been in the past 50 years in the GATT/WTO 
system?  What are the future prospects for reciprocity and non-discrimination as the keys 
to further trade liberalization? 
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Rounds of GATT/WTO Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
 
No. Years  Name  Accomplishments  Countries
1 1947  Geneva  Reduced  Tariffs  23 
2 1949  Annecy  Reduced  Tariffs  13 
3 1951  Torquay  Reduced  Tariffs  38 
4 1956  Geneva  Reduced  Tariffs  26 
5 1960-61  Dillon  Reduced  Tariffs  26 
6  1964-67  Kennedy  Tariffs and Anti-dumping  62 
7  1973-79  Tokyo  Tariffs and NTBs, Framework Agreements  102 
8  1986-94  Uruguay  Tariffs, NTBs, Rules, Services, Intellectual Property, 
Textiles, Agriculture, Dispute Settlement, Created 
WTO 
123 
9 2001  to 
date 
Doha  To cover reduction/removal of: agricultural tariffs, 
export subsidies, and domestic supports; tariffs on 
manufactures; and services barriers, clarification of 
various WTO rules and agreements 
150 
Source:  “The GATT Years from Havana to Marrakesh” [www.wto.org] 
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•  Most favored nation (MFN) treatment 
•  Market access based on reciprocity 
•  Prohibition of quantitative import restrictions 
•  Customs valuation and procedures 
•  Transparency (especially in standards) 
•  Safeguards 
•  Antidumping 
•  Dispute settlement 
 
Present disciplines requiring modification to take legitimate national interests into account 
 
•  Domestic subsidies 
•  TRIMS 
•  TRIPS 
•  Government procurement 
 
Preferential trading arrangements that do not inhibit global trade (Article XXIV) 
 
•  Customs unions 
•  Free trade arrangements 
•  Sectoral arrangements 
•  Developing country preferences 
 
National regulations for health, safety, and consumer protection 
 
•  Countries set their own national standards, without protectionist intent 
 
National regulations wholly beyond WTO boundaries 
 
•  Labor and environmental standards 
•  Regulations affecting service industries exempt from market access negotiations 
•  Competition policy 
 
Source:  Brown and Stern (2006, p. 268). 
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Average Tariffs on Manufactures 























Source:  Crafts (2000), Table 2.4, p. 28. 
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Source:  Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins (2006, Vol. 2, p. 11). 
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Numbers of Dispute Settlement Actions and Dispositions 
 
Source: Pelzman and Shohan (2007, p. 20). 
 
 
  47Figure 5 
Complaining and Responding Country Concentration 
 
Source: Pelzman and Shohan (2007, p. 21). 
 
 
  48